In China’s political system, officials don’t resign—they vanish. Just last month, Xi Jinping shocked the world by purging China’s top general Zhang Youxia as well as senior military officer Liu Zhenli; if we consider these together with the more recent removal of 19 high-ranking officials within the party, a pattern begins to emerge: Xi’s power is weakening, and this contradicts growing fears of an imminent invasion of Taiwan. Rather than signaling preparation for war, his purges expose a leadership focused on consolidating control amid internal instability. 

Beijing released a report that portrayed these purges as part of a long-standing effort to clean up the corruption within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, if this was purely about enforcing party loyalty, the scale of these removals would not appear to be so volatile– especially for a regime setting its eyes on invading Taiwan. In fact, these actions suggest the opposite of readiness; they establish a military undergoing internal turmoil– clearly not prepared for a high-risk invasion.

The 2024 “hotpot missile” scandal reinforces this concern. Reports that corruption within China’s Rocket Force led to Chinese troops using solid fuel from missiles and aircraft fuel to cook hotpot due to supply shortages. Whether exaggerated or not, the implications of this scandal are significant: If Xi cannot fully control or monitor his own military, he cannot reliably command it in wartime. A successful invasion would require an absolute confidence in not only leadership but also logistics, and yet these reports point to a force that is undisciplined and highly under-resourced- definitely not of sufficient preparation for a high-risk invasion of Taiwan.

Gahon Chiang, who works in the office of Legislator Chen Kuan Ting of the Democratic Progressive Party in Chiayi County, specializing in international relations, states, “Xi must centralize his power by cutting down on members in the CCP to prevent dissent.” Gahon also challenged the invasion narrative by stating, “They are clearly not ready to launch an invasion on Taiwan.” Likewise, Ms. Tsai, who is an Upper School Mandarin teacher, has said: “I don’t think China will invade Taiwan in the near future, but we as TAS students must always mentally prepare ourselves for the unexpected.” Taken together, these perspectives reinforce the same conclusion: Xi’s actions are not those of a leader who aims to prepare for war but rather to secure his own position. A successful invasion of Taiwan would require not just loyalty but absolute confidence in military capability, which the current purges and corruption scandals clearly undermine. 

Ultimately, Xi Jinping is not aiming to launch an invasion of Taiwan —not yet. The ongoing purges point to a regime still grappling with large internal weaknesses. While China will likely continue to apply pressure through gray zone tactics and military exercises, a full-scale invasion remains unlikely in the near future. For those of us in Taiwan, the threat should not be dismissed– but should be clearly understood. The greatest risk today is not immediate war, but a prolonged period of tension shaped by China still trying to stabilize itself before taking its next step on the global stage.